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2020 Vision 
Visioning the Future of the United  
Nations Peacebuilding Architecture
Carolyn McAskie 
Preface  From the Project Director 
At the 2005 World Summit in New York City, member states of the 
United Nations agreed to create “a dedicated institutional mechanism 
to address the special needs of countries emerging from conflict to-
wards recovery, reintegration and reconstruction and to assist them in 
laying the foundation for sustainable development”. That new mecha-
nism was the UN Peacebuilding Commission and two associated bod-
ies: a Peacebuilding Support Office and a Peacebuilding Fund. To-
gether, these new entities have been characterized as the UN’s new 
peacebuilding architecture, or PBA. 
 
This Working Paper is one of nine essays that examine the possible 
future role of the UN’s peacebuilding architecture. They were written 
as part of a project co-organized by the Centre for International Policy 
Studies at the University of Ottawa and the Norwegian Institute of  
International Affairs. All of the contributors to the project were asked 
to identify realistic but ambitious “stretch targets” for the Peacebuild-
ing Commission and its associated bodies over the next five to ten 
years. The resulting Working Papers, including this one, seek to 
stimulate fresh thinking about the UN’s role in peacebuilding.  
 
The moment is ripe for such rethinking: During 2010, the UN will re-
view the performance of the PBA to date, including the question of 
whether it has achieved its mandated objectives. Most of the contribu-
tors to this project believe that the PBA should pursue a more ambi-
tious agenda over the next five years. While the PBC and its associ-
ated bodies have succeeded in carving out a niche for themselves, that 
niche remains a small one. Yet the need for more focused international 
attention, expertise, and coordinated and sustained assistance towards 
war-torn countries is undiminished. It remains to be seen whether UN 
officials and the organization’s member states will rise to the chal-
lenge of delivering on the PBA’s initial promise over the next five 
years and beyond, but doing so will at least require a vision of what 
the PBA can potentially accomplish in this period. The Working  
Papers produced in this project are intended to provide grist for this 
visioning effort. 
 
Roland Paris 
Ottawa, January 2010 
 
Summary 
Despite the overwhelming impact of major global crises, the actual 
number of conflicts has been reduced significantly since the end of the 
cold war. At the same time too many post-conflict countries either fall 
back into violence or fail to get on the path to sustainable peace. More 
is now understood about the link between global security and the lack 
of economic and social investment. This combination of analyses has 
provided the impetus behind the development of peacebuilding as a 
field in its own right and the creation of new international architecture.  
 
The Peacebuilding Architecture was launched following the UN 
World Summit, 2005. Its main goal is to bring increased strategy, re-
sources and coherence to political, peacekeeping, development,  
humanitarian and human rights activities designed to keep countries 
on a sustainable road to peace.  
 
To move forward the PBA must develop a more aggressive approach 
as follows:  
 
 be more proactive in its relations with the Security Council, par-
ticularly in building understanding of the fundamental link be-
tween security and development;  
 implement its mandate to mobilize predictable resources for 
peacebuilding;  
 take a longer view of peacebuilding which encompasses all  
aspects of the spectrum of peace activities, including peacemaking 
and preventive development investment in fragile states;  
 seek to become the focal point in a global system defining and 
supporting peacebuilding policy, research and applied techniques; 
 support the creation of UN mandated integrated peacebuilding 
missions, raising resources and bringing all the operational actors 
to the table in a supportive and coherent manner. 
 
 
 
Introduction 
For some time now, there has been convincing evidence that despite 
the overwhelming impact of major crises, whether Iraq, Afghanistan 
or the Middle East, the actual number of conflicts has been reduced 
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significantly since the end of the cold war1. At the same time, how-
ever, research shows us that too many post-conflict countries either 
fall back into violence or fail to get on the path to sustainable peace.2 
More is now understood about the link between global security and 
the lack of economic and social investment. This combination of 
events is probably the single most important impetus behind the new 
preoccupation with peacebuilding as a field in its own right and the 
creation of new international architecture to deal with it, the United 
Nations Peacebuilding Commission. The Peacebuilding Architecture 
will be the subject of a General Assembly review in 2010. 
 
 
 
Part One: What is Peacebuilding? 
Any discussion of the Peacebuilding Architecture and its future must 
begin with a discussion of what we mean by peacebuilding. There are 
as many definitions of peacebuilding as there are peacebuilders, but 
for this writer, peacebuilding is not so much an activity in itself, nei-
ther is it a point on the spectrum following peacekeeping, but a meth-
odology, a way of approaching a range of activities designed to main-
tain nations and their people on track for a just and sustainable peace. 
Under this approach, peacebuilding can be the lens through which we 
look at all peace related activities, whether peacemaking, peacekeep-
ing, early post conflict recovery and nation building on into a longer 
term process of sustainable development for peace. For many, peace-
building has become synonymous with state-building or nation-
building, or more particularly the period sometimes referred to as 
early recovery or activities in the immediate aftermath of conflict. 
While this is undoubtedly peacebuilding, it is by no means the whole 
story and narrows the field with potentially disastrous or at least 
wasteful consequences.  
 
For peacebuilding to succeed, what is needed is a shared understand-
ing among the actors, internal and external, of what the crisis itself is 
really all about. Each actor brings their own analysis to the problem 
and bases their own intervention on that analysis. The conflict that 
launched in 2001 in Cote d’Ivoire is an excellent example. Whether 
you were President Laurent Gbagbo, neighbouring Burkina Faso 
President Blaise Campaore, rebel leader Guillaume Soro, Charles Tay-
lor of Liberia, the French Government, the United Nations (whether 
                                                 
1  Human Security Centre, University of British Columbia, Human Security Report, 2005, 
War and Peace in the 21st Century 
2  World Bank Policy Research Report, Breaking the Conflict Trap, Civil War and Devel-
opment Policy, 2003 
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the Security Council or the Humanitarian Agencies), or a myriad of 
other actors, you saw the situation as something totally different and 
you responded accordingly. It is unrealistic to expect that each of 
these disparate actors would have sat down together; after all, for 
many of the actors, power and influence were at stake. But at a much 
earlier point, those actors who claimed that they were dedicated to 
supporting a solution, could have pooled their intellectual resources 
and pulled together in a more efficient way, starting with a definition 
of an end-game based on a shared understanding of what was really at 
stake. This I believe should be the first rule of peacebuilding that it 
will not succeed unless all the players are at the table and willing 
to share their understanding of the issues. 
 
If we are to have a shared understanding of peacebuilding we need a 
shared understanding of what bringing an end to conflict really means. 
It is not just an end to hostilities, critical as that is, nor is it the creation 
of democratic government, i.e. post-conflict electoral processes, pav-
ing the way for participatory development, worthy as this is. Rather, 
bringing an end to conflict must encompass a series of inter-related 
steps from the moment that national and international actors start to 
monitor a conflict up to the point where a country’s development 
takes off in a sustainable way. While peacemaking has as its primary 
objective negotiating an end to hostilities, the peace agreements which 
have been most successful in the long run are those which also take 
account of what has to happen, and by whom, after the hostilities are 
ended. The Arusha agreements on Burundi are a case in point. The 
1993 Arusha agreement, essentially an agreement to end hostilities, 
ended in assassination, whereas the 2000 Arusha Accord3, despite its 
flaws, laid out a blue print for political burden sharing, reconciliation 
and justice, rebuilding core institutions at the local, regional and  
national level, bringing the refugees home, and a range of other peace-
building and development initiatives. In addition, peace negotiations 
need to ensure the inclusion of all affected parties, not just combat-
ants. Peace is not just to be negotiated by those who made war, but 
must include those affected by war. In this sense, the Arusha Accord 
of 2000 fell short of an ideal, as while the process engaged a broad 
range of political actors, critical combatant groups were excluded as 
were groups of women, civil society and religious leaders, despite 
their special pleas to be included. So the second rule of peacebuild-
ing is that it has to start at the time of peacemaking, be inclusive 
of all aspects of society and lay down a blue print for building sus-
tainable peace. 
 
Modern peacekeeping has learnt the lesson that peacekeeping is not 
just a military and security function, but encompasses a range of state-
                                                 
3  The Arusha Peace and Reconciliation Agreement for Burundi, Arusha, 28 August 2000 
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building activities which are recognized as part of the peacebuilding 
spectrum, whether political support, human rights, rule of law, civilian 
police, integration of combatants, gender equality, children’s rights 
and others. As a result, the Security Council, since the land-mark Bra-
himi report4, has increasingly funded functions which go further and 
further into the domain of peacebuilding. In the UN this is done within 
a clear command structure with a civilian control of the military. The 
current determination of the UN Security Council to “stay the course” 
on peacekeeping as peacebuilding means that the international com-
munity is now putting a modest part of the US $8 billion peacekeeping 
budget to peacebuilding activities, via the assessed budgetary process. 
This gives us the third rule of peacebuilding, that where there are 
peacekeeping operations, peacebuilding must go hand in hand and 
must be funded accordingly. 
 
Post conflict recovery remains the area where international and  
national communities have the least experience, the least well devel-
oped tools and the least amount of available funding. It is this stage 
which most players identify as peacebuilding; when special efforts 
must be made to assist post-conflict countries to stay the course; when 
societies are particularly vulnerable; and when the risk of relapse into 
conflict is high. The international community is learning the lesson 
that a political agreement, ceasefires, peacekeeping and elections are 
still not enough. Too often, after withdrawing costly political and mili-
tary players, the world has expected the traditional donor community 
to take over in assisting newly minted governments to get on their 
feet. However, not enough donor organizations have developed the 
tools to operate in a post conflict environment. In addition many coun-
tries in this situation are not on traditional donor lists as partner coun-
tries because for too long they have been seen as “non-performing”, so 
they have few, if any, real donor partners ready to jump in. So the 
fourth (and perhaps the most important) rule of peacebuilding is 
that a new form of international partnership and support must 
emerge to help countries stay the course for peace. It is here that 
the new UN Peacebuilding Architecture can have the greatest im-
pact. 
 
Another important lesson being learned is that the broad range of  
actors, whether political and security, humanitarian and human rights, 
development and commercial, must have a better understanding of 
how each of the parts work together to make a successful whole. Poli-
tical and developmental actors have too often worked separately on 
different aspects of peacebuilding. However, political solutions are 
often hampered by lack of development investment, and development 
                                                 
4  United Nations, Report of the Panel on United Nations Peace Operations A/55/305/ - 
S/2000/809, 21 August 2000 
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investment is often wasted if it takes place outside the framework of 
the political timetable. Security actors must pay attention to rule of 
law, human rights issues and the need for economic investment, and 
humanitarian intervention must not end before development has taken 
off. So the fifth rule of peacebuilding must be to seek a better inte-
gration of political, security, economic, social and humanitarian 
approaches to ensure that these actors complement each other in a 
strategic way. We must better understand how lack of develop-
ment creates a security risk and inversely, how development in-
vestment can improve the security environment.  
 
Finally, for countries and regions with a history of conflict, traditional 
development approaches must be adapted to ensure that investment 
for development continues to be oriented towards addressing areas 
which gave rise to conflict in the past and to building and maintaining 
consensus in the long term. Too often, societies are looking for ap-
proaches and methodologies to “solve” their problems, whereas what 
societies need are methodologies to “manage” legitimate conflicts. No 
society is without conflict. The most successful societies are those 
which learn to manage their conflicts without recourse to violence. So 
the sixth and final rule of peacebuilding is that it never stops. 
 
 
 
Part Two: Genesis of the  
Peacebuilding Commission 
Immediate Post-Cold War 
It has become a truism now to say that the end of the Cold War 
changed the nature of the threats to peace and security. The break-
down of the bi-polar world changed the basis for state interaction with 
several long-standing conflicts such as Cambodia, Afghanistan (the 
earlier version), Angola, Mozambique and El Salvador coming to an 
end, although each for reasons of its own. This did not mean an end to 
conflict but a change in the nature of conflicts with internal or intra-
state conflicts erupting. Somalia, Rwanda and Haiti were reminders 
that the end of the Cold War did not usher in an era of peace and sta-
bility.  
 
The international community grappled with the challenges of respond-
ing to these developments; how to overcome the shortcomings of ex-
isting tools and approaches; and how to encourage more integrated 
efforts of the range of separate actors – whether in peacemaking, 
peacekeeping, humanitarian relief, human rights or development. Over 
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the late nineties and into the new century there was a continuous im-
provement in approaches in all of these sectors, but what remained 
elusive was how to get them to work together more effectively and to 
understand why that was important for success.  
 
UN Secretary-General Boutros-Boutros Ghali’s groundbreaking 1992 
Agenda for Peace5 introduced the concept of peacebuilding within the 
UN, identifying preventive diplomacy, peacemaking, peacekeeping 
and peacebuilding as key instruments in the UN’s toolkit in respond-
ing to violent conflicts. The major missing element was the develop-
ment agenda and the need for preventive investment in fragile states. 
 
In the 1992 definitions, Peacemaking would involve a hands-on ap-
proach with the use of special mediators and the development of the 
concept of the “good offices” of the Secretary-General. Peacekeeping, 
which was expected to take place after a peace agreement, was de-
fined as “the deployment of a United Nations presence in the field, 
hitherto with the consent of all the parties concerned, normally involv-
ing United Nations military and/or police personnel and frequently 
civilians as well.” Peacebuilding, appearing for the first time as an 
official UN concept, was defined as “post-conflict action to identify 
and support structures which tend to strengthen and solidify peace to 
avoid a relapse into conflict.”  
 
This distinction was largely based upon a sequential approach to the 
transition from war to peace which had characterized inter-state con-
flicts but which did not hold true in the complex political emergencies 
and violent intra-state conflicts that were confronting the international 
community in the immediate post-Cold War years. Very often these 
conflicts did not end in a decisive military victory, even when there 
was a formal peace agreement, but remained in an uncertain state of 
neither war nor peace, with a complex set of outstanding problems 
such as upholding a ceasefire, disarming former combatants, resettling 
refugees and internally displaced people, holding elections and reha-
bilitating a war-ravaged economy. 
 
As a result, traditional peacekeeping operations began extending their 
mandates through the addition of a wide range of non-military activi-
ties, including the monitoring and organization of elections and the 
reform, or even the creation, of governmental institutions. The United 
Nations Transitional Assistance Group (UNTAG) in Namibia (1989-
1990) was the first such type of operation, with a mandate including 
elections, policing, and demilitarization. This was followed by com-
plex peacekeeping (and peacebuilding) operations in El Salvador 
                                                 
5  1992, United Nations, An Agenda for Peace: Preventive diplomacy, peacemaking and 
peace-keeping. Report of the Secretary-General A/47/277 – S/24111, 17 June 1992 
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(ONUSAL, 1991-5), Angola (UNAVEM II, 1991-5), and Cambodia 
(UNTAC, 1991-3). They included in their mandates human rights and 
elections monitoring, the demobilization and reintegration of former 
combatants into civilian life, and the promotion of economic liberali-
zation (although no funding for the latter).  
 
Despite this, the 1990s also witnessed serious setbacks as countries 
such as Angola, Somalia, Haiti, Zaire/DRC and Burundi relapsed into 
violence. Transitions from conflict were proving to be long and com-
plex and often unsustainable. Shortcomings to peacekeeping were 
dramatically highlighted in the tragedies of Somalia, Rwanda and Sre-
brenica, giving rise to fundamental questions of how peacekeeping 
mandates should be designed and executed. The Security Council fal-
tered in the late nineties as a result, but in 2000, with the Council’s 
agreement, Secretary-General Kofi Annan commissioned a compre-
hensive review of peace operations designed to recommend funda-
mental changes to UN Peacekeeping. The Brahimi report6, as it came 
to be known after its main author, senior Algerian diplomat Lakhdar 
Brahimi, introduced more robust, complex and sustained missions 
which were to “stay the course”.  
The System Matures 
Interventions in Kosovo (UNMIK), Timor Leste (UNTAET), and  
Sierra Leone (UNAMSIL) with ambitious mandates of nation-
building reflected this trend. These operations were soon followed by 
complex missions in Afghanistan (UNAMA), Burundi (ONUB), the 
Democratic Republic of the Congo (MONUC), Côte d’Ivoire 
(UNOCI), Liberia (UNMIL), Haiti (MINUSTAH), and two Sudan 
missions (UNMIS and UNAMID). By 2009, the UN had over 90,000 
military and 20,000 civilians in peacekeeping missions.  
 
While peacekeeping was taking on tasks traditionally the purview of 
the development and political sectors, the academic and development 
communities, recognizing the difficulties, were looking at how to as-
sist countries stay the course for peace. Development in the 1990’s 
had increasingly focused on rewarding performance, ignoring the 
question of how to bring non-performing countries into the system, 
giving rise to greater numbers of the poorer developing world which 
were either failed or failing states. Despite the gloom and doom analy-
ses of the effectiveness of aid, policy makers believe that while other 
instruments are essential, including trade, aid has contributed to a 
more poor centred growth in the developing world – but not for all. 
In 2004, the World Bank’s annual development report on Conflict and 
                                                 
6  The Report of the Panel on United Nations Peace Operations 
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Development7 showed that many countries coming out of conflict, 
particularly those known as the “aid orphans”, had fallen back within 
five to ten years after a peace agreement. Other researchers were 
documenting similar trends. We only have to look at Haiti and Liberia 
to see that the international community had a habit of mounting com-
plex efforts and then leaving too soon. Central Africa and Africa’s 
Great Lakes region experienced serious and repetitive conflicts in the 
immediate post-Cold War years, despite repeated interventions. And 
in 2006 just as the new Peacebuilding Commission was opening its 
doors, Timor Leste had a substantial relapse requiring the re-
engagement of the Security Council.  
 
Traditionally, there has been a reasonably clear division of labour 
among peacekeepers, humanitarian actors and development agencies. 
Humanitarian actors worked in conflict or disaster zones, guided by 
the humanitarian principle of impartiality. They avoided too close an 
association with any military activity, including peacekeepers to pro-
tect their neutral humanitarian space. Development actors generally 
avoided working in conflict zones, focusing their efforts on socio-
economic issues in peaceful or post-conflict contexts, i.e. countries 
who could be counted on as reliable “performers”.  
 
However, given the post-cold war trend of intra-state conflicts, both 
relief and development actors found themselves facing more complex 
environments. Humanitarian actors found themselves at risk in com-
plex political emergencies and civil wars such as in Somalia and 
Rwanda where established humanitarian principles and international 
humanitarian law did not hold – at the end of the nineties more  
humanitarian actors than peacekeepers were dying in conflict zones. 
Development actors were increasingly called upon to provide assi-
stance to countries that were at various phases of the transition from 
conflict even though their tool kit was not designed to deal with the 
challenges facing conflict or post-conflict countries.  
 
A small but significant number of donors (e.g. the UK and the Nor-
dics) began to develop new approaches to operating in immediate post 
conflict environments. At the United Nations, there was greater em-
phasis on coordination among the various players identifying the need 
for greater collaboration between civilian and military actors in con-
flict and post-conflict contexts. The publication of the OECD DAC 
guidelines on Helping Prevent Violent Conflict 8 opened the door for 
development actors to design new programs and projects in such areas 
as security sector reform, rule of law and DDR, areas where donors do 
not get DAC credit for their expenditures.  
                                                 
7  WB Conflict and Development, as above 
8  OECD, Helping Prevent Violent Conflict, DAC Guidelines, 2001 
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Greater UN efforts were being made to improve coordination on the 
ground, particularly through the system of humanitarian coordinators 
who worked with UN agencies, Red Cross and civil society and pro-
vided a vehicle for bilateral donors to address the human cost of com-
plex emergencies. At UN headquarters various exercises were under-
way; Sadako Ogata’s Brookings Process which brought UNHCR, the 
World Bank and UNDP together under the umbrella of the Brookings 
Institute to review the humanitarian-development interface; efforts by 
the development and humanitarian actors to deal with what was called 
the transition from relief to development, including internal guidelines 
developed in the UN Secretariat’s Executive Committee on Humani-
tarian Affairs (ECHA). Some of the main problems identified were 
lack of tools and lack of donor funding (or interest) for the unique 
type of assistance required in the post conflict environment. The In-
ternational Financial Institutions (particularly the World Bank) and the 
UN agencies (particularly UNDP) began developing instruments to 
deal with fragile states and conflict prone countries, with UNDP ex-
panding its capability in the new Bureau for Conflict Prevention and 
Reconstruction (BCPR). One of the outcomes of this process, the Post 
Conflict Needs Assessment is a broad based analytical tool being ap-
plied by members of the UN Development Group in cooperation with 
other multilateral actors particularly the World Bank.  
 
At the same time, with the development of more complex peacekeep-
ing operations, there was a push to integrate UN security/political ef-
forts on the ground with humanitarian/development efforts already on 
site, a move long sought by the peacekeeping community and resisted 
by the humanitarian community, but finally over-ruled by Secretary-
General Kofi Annan who, in 2002, decided to appoint the newly as-
signed Head of the UN Development Team in Sierra Leone as the first 
Deputy SRSG in the Sierra Leone peacekeeping mission thereby 
achieving de facto integration. This has now evolved to be the stan-
dard for all missions.  
Towards a More Comprehensive Approach  
Concepts and practices of peacebuilding, therefore, were moving 
ahead, informing peacekeeping, humanitarian and development ap-
proaches, although still on parallel, rather than integrated tracks. It 
was still not universally defined as such, but gradually, particularly 
through missions such as Kosovo, Afghanistan, East Timor, peace-
building came to be seen as facilitating processes and building new 
national capabilities, particularly in rule of law, to address the causes 
of conflict as a basis for longer term peace. However, its infrastructure 
remained spread across multiple institutions and actors spanning the 
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military-civilian, the bilateral-multilateral and civil society divides. 
Funding for anything beyond the Security Council agreed activities 
remained a problem. 
 
For policy makers, peacebuilders and academics alike, it was becom-
ing more obvious that the end of the war was not the end of the pro-
cess, but the beginning of the next set of challenges, requiring contin-
ued military resources along with major financial and political com-
mitments. The international community was beginning to understand 
that long term sustainable peace would require a new analysis of how 
economic and social factors, along with human rights and justice 
needed to interact with the political and security agenda. It could no 
longer be a question of political, security and economic actors work-
ing alone in their own spheres.  
 
There had been a number of earlier, but tentative, institutional at-
tempts to address this. In fact in 1998, the Security Council encour-
aged the Secretary-General to find ways to establish a peacebuilding 
capability and two years later, the Brahimi Report recommended the 
creation of a focal point for peacebuilding within the United Nations 
Secretariat to coordinate the many different activities that peace en-
tails. However, there was no real enthusiasm on the part of member 
states, and no impetus from within the independent sectors of the 
United Nations.  
 
 
 
Part three: The Peacebuilding  
Architecture  
It was within this context that in 2004, the Report of the Secretary-
General’s High Level Panel on Threats Challenges and Change9 sug-
gested the creation of a new intergovernmental body to provide the 
sustained attention that had been lacking. In his response, In Larger 
Freedom,10 prepared for the September, 2005 World Summit, the Sec-
retary-General proposed that this body advise on and promote inte-
grated strategies for peacebuilding, with a primary focus on country 
specific activities in support of effective country-level planning. In his 
words, “no part of the UN system effectively addresses the challenge 
of helping countries transition from war to lasting peace.”  
                                                 
9  United Nations, Report of the High-Level Panel on Threats, Challenges and Change, 
2004 
10  United Nations, In Larger Freedom: towards development, security and human rights for 
all. A/59/2005, 21 March 2005 
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The core of the proposal was the creation of a forum, a Peacebuilding 
Commission, in which UN entities, major bilateral donors, troop con-
tributors, relevant regional actors and organizations, IFIs, civil society 
and national governments could share information about post-conflict 
recovery strategies and facilitate coherent decision-making. It would 
rally all of the various actors, governmental and non-governmental, 
around common priorities, ensure predictable financing and sustained 
political and financial attention. The Commission would be matched 
with a Peacebuilding Fund and a Peacebuilding Support Office in the 
UN Secretariat to support the Commission and bring coherence to UN 
efforts.  
 
As a result, the UN General Assembly’s Outcome Document of the 
2005 World Summit laid down as one of its most important reform 
proposals, a Peacebuilding Commission as an intergovernmental advi-
sory committee, a subsidiary of both the Security Council and the 
General Assembly, to address the critical gap in the international 
community’s ability to meet the needs of countries emerging from 
violent conflict11.  
 
The PBC’s central purpose would be to bring together all relevant 
actors to marshal resources and to advise on and propose inte-
grated strategies for post-conflict peacebuilding and recovery. In 
doing so, it would:  
 
 Help ensure predictable financing for early recovery activi-
ties and sustained financial investment over the medium to 
long-term;  
 Extend the period of attention provided by the international 
community to post-conflict peacebuilding and recovery; and  
 Develop best practices on issues that require extensive col-
laboration among political, security, humanitarian and devel-
opment actors.  
 
The Commission is made up of 31 member states: 7 Security Council 
members (including the 5 permanent members); 7 Economic and  
Social Council members; 5 top providers of assessed and voluntary 
contributions to the UN; 5 top providers of military personnel and  
civilian police to UN missions (a first); and 7 additional members that 
help to ensure adequate regional representation selected by the Gen-
eral Assembly.  
                                                 
11  United Nations, 2005 World Summit Outcome, A/Res/ 60/1, 24 October 2005 
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The PBA’s First Years  
The PBC had a difficult procedural birth, with the inevitable UN focus 
on process over substance. But member states showed that they 
wanted to make a real name for the Commission as a working, know-
ledge-based body with a substantive agenda. The test of relevance is 
already there as it brings financial and political results for Burundi and 
Sierra Leone – the first two countries on its agenda. The third and 
fourth, Guinea Bissau and the Central African Republic (CAR) pre-
sent much more difficult political challenges than the first two, lack-
ing governments with full control over their territories.  
 
In engaging with these countries, the PBA has taken seriously its 
mandate “to bring together all the relevant actors”. As outlined above, 
if peacebuilding is going to work, it must do so on a shared under-
standing of the problems and a shared commitment to work together 
to address them effectively. It is only in this way that the concerned 
actors can identify the requirements and bring all the sectors, includ-
ing bilateral and multilateral, official and non-governmental, national 
and international, together in the search for strategic and meaningful 
solutions. Its country committees go beyond the core 31 members of 
the Commission to bring in all the political, financial and development 
actors, including, as an essential element, the country itself. The con-
cept of local ownership is paramount. A country must decide to en-
gage with the PBC, and its own priorities are at the heart of the work 
of the commission.  
 
Within the country committees, the PBC engages with the country to 
develop a clear strategy based on priorities and commitments from the 
country and its partners to address the priorities. After a devastating 
civil conflict, everything legitimately can be a priority. However, it is 
essential for all actors to agree on a short list of key priorities which 
need to be addressed to keep the country on track politically, enable it 
to meet the urgent needs of its citizens and begin the process of eco-
nomic recovery. Experience has shown that the process itself of de-
veloping the shared strategy, called the Integrated Peacebuilding Strat-
egy, or IPBS, has proven to be an important element as it forces the 
players to work together and negotiate priorities and justify choices. It 
has brought new partners to the table, whether local civil society, of-
ten previously excluded, and some new donors. The weakness remains 
in the longer term commitment of all parties to be guided by the pri-
orities in their own interventions. 
 
One worry was that the PBC would focus exclusively on financing 
and that the PBC would become just another donor forum. Financing 
for post conflict recovery is essential, particularly as many of the af-
fected countries are ones described as “aid orphans” by the World 
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Bank or those which have been the “forgotten crises”. Serious finan-
cial attention, including broadening the donor base, is fundamental to 
recovery, as outlined persuasively in “The Bottom Billion”, Paul Col-
lier’s landmark publication12. However, it is recognized that the 
Commission would need to understand the political fragilities inherent 
in post conflict situations and to help newly minted governments stay 
on track. In the North/South atmosphere which prevails in New York, 
this might have proven difficult. It might also have been seen by the 
Security Council as mandate creep. However, in Burundi, Sierra 
Leone and Guinea-Bissau, the PBC has proven that it can speak 
frankly and seek to influence the countries. There is evidence that this 
has had a positive effect in a number of cases. Particularly in Burundi 
and Sierra Leone, both governments have sought to ensure that PBC 
endorsement was forthcoming for their financial and political actions.  
 
The strategic approach is now in its fourth iteration and as a first at-
tempt is encouraging, although it is proving to be more labour inten-
sive than is appropriate for an inter-governmental body. This will have 
to be streamlined in the future. In addition to the country committees 
struck by the PBC, local steering committees, co-chaired on the 
ground by the government and the UN, and bringing together other 
donors, IFIs, political and regional actors and civil society, have been 
useful drivers of the integrated peacebuilding strategies. In fact, in 
some ways the local process has been more successful in being inclu-
sive than the New York level bodies, particularly in the inclusion of 
local civil society. There remain real difficulties in bringing civil soci-
ety into an inter-governmental body, and it is physically impossible to 
engage the sub-regional actors in New York. New methodologies will 
need to be developed to address this. 
 
Despite the worry that it “would be all about financing”, the very real 
worry is that the PBA has not found a workable methodology (or poli-
tical will) to enable it to implement its mandate to mobilize resources. 
The Security Council has access to the process of assessed budgets 
under which once the Peacekeeping mission’s parameters are set, they 
are costed and member states pay their assessed share. Development 
and humanitarian activities (and by extension, peacebuilding) are 
funded through voluntary contributions, or discretionary funding. If 
the PBA is going to launch its countries on a sustainable path to peace 
they cannot rely on the old inefficient methods of waiting to see who 
steps up to the plate and expect to have credibility as a new mecha-
nism with new approaches to sustainable peace.  
 
                                                 
12  Paul Collier, The Bottom Billion, Why the poorest countries are failing and what can be 
done about it. (Oxford University Press, 2007) 
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In its first years the Commission has had an awkward relationship 
with the Security Council, a question related to UN North/South poli-
tics, where G-77 member states believe, not without foundation, that 
OECD countries are by and large more concerned with addressing the 
security agenda than with providing urgent support to the develop-
ment agenda. This has not been helped by the fact that the five perma-
nent members of the Security Council insisted on permanent member-
ship of the PBC, but few of them engaged with the Commission. A 
healthy PBC/SC relationship will be a key to the future workings of 
the PBC. 
The Peacebuilding Fund (PBF) 
The Peacebuilding Fund was set up to provide flexibility for the Sec-
retary-General to provide catalytic funding in urgent situations and to 
launch peacebuilding efforts prior to the implementation of long term 
project funding. It is allocated in the first instance to countries on the 
PBC agenda, but is also available for other countries declared eligible 
by the UNSG. There is an external advisory group appointed by the 
SG.  
 
There has been an awkward relationship between the PBC and the 
PBF with some PBC members believing that they had authority over 
the allocation of the Fund. Certainly in PBC countries, Fund alloca-
tions must follow the priorities set out in the PBC strategy, but overall 
decisions are under the authority of the Secretary General. Other 
members, particularly some donors, believe that their obligations  
under the founding PBC resolution to “mobilize resources” have been 
met by their contributions to the PBF. The PBF is a useful instrument 
and is being applied strategically, but funding for peacebuilding will 
require massive amounts well beyond the capacity of the fund. If 
member states are prepared to see the annual budget (from assessed 
budgets) for peacekeeping grow to $8 billion a year, and if they are 
serious about peacebuilding, then where is the equivalent effort for 
ensuring that peacekeeping efforts are not wasted due to lack of sup-
port for peacebuilding? This is a key challenge for the long term suc-
cess of the PBA. 
The Peacebuilding Support Office (PBSO)  
The third pillar is the UN Secretariat office created to support the 
work of the Peacebuilding Commission, manage the Peacebuilding 
Fund and support the Secretary-General in convening the UN System 
for peacebuilding. As is usual practice in the UN budgetary debates, 
much of the funding was to come from “within existing resources”. 
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This did not give the PBSO the wherewithal to mount a strong effort 
early on. In fact, it began its work with only three professionals.  
 
The PBSO supports the commission’s agenda through the country 
processes, both in supporting the design and implementation of the 
strategic approaches to peacebuilding, while the actual implementa-
tion is done by the UN and other operational actors, particularly in the 
field, working closely with national governments. The PBSO aims to 
build itself up as a knowledge centre for lessons learned and good 
practices on peacebuilding. An important aspect of this has been the 
creation of web-based networks to bring together the growing number 
of civil society, academic and government efforts in peacebuilding.  
 
A controversial role for the PBSO has been its mandate to convene the 
UN system to ensure a coherent approach to peacebuilding among UN 
actors; controversial among certain member states, who saw it as a 
function which would detract from the PBSO’s ability to support the 
PBC, and controversial among UN system actors who saw it as an en-
croachment into operational functions. The Office, however, needs to 
be positioned to convene the system to undertake strategic discussions 
around peacebuilding, whether in the context of integrated peacebuild-
ing strategies or during the planning of Integrated Missions. This need 
not mean an operational role for the PBSO, but it must mean that the 
integrated strategies will have operational implications for UN field 
actors, as it will impact on their priorities and their methodologies as 
well as on the way they inter-act with other players.  
 
The PBSO has been set up as a very small office with a restricted 
budget reporting independently and directly to the Secretary-General. 
This has caused problems with UN department heads who believe that 
peacebuilding should come under their areas of responsibility, particu-
larly the Department of Political Affairs. The decade long debate on 
peacebuilding within the UN, however, which led to the 2004 High 
Level Panel and the subsequent decisions are predicated on the under-
standing that peacebuilding is neither a purely political, security nor 
developmental process, but must bring together security, political, 
economic, social and human rights elements in a coherent and inte-
grated way. Since December 2006, however, the senior UN team 
which designed the architecture have all been replaced by a team 
which has not been through the same learning process, so the reality 
and positioning of the PBSO has been under threat. 
Other Peacebuilding Actors  
There is no monopoly over peacebuilding activities within the UN 
system. Many organizations and bodies have peacebuilding mandates 
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and components. As has been made clear in this text, the 20 UN 
peacekeeping operations rightly include mandates covering an array of 
peace building activities. 10 special political missions and peacebuild-
ing support offices in the Middle East, Africa, and Asia fielded by the 
Department of Political Affairs are active on peacemaking and peace-
building. UNDP’s Bureau for Conflict Prevention and Recovery and 
other Funds and Programmes are active in peacebuilding where every-
one is quickly learning lessons. The World Bank is a leader in the 
field both in policy and financial terms, and Regional Development 
Banks, particularly the African Development Bank are becoming 
more active.  
 
Beyond the UN, more and more peacebuilding actors are appearing on 
the scene, including regional actors such as the AU and the EU. Bilat-
eral donors, NGOs, research centres and institutions, and policy orga-
nizations such as the OECD contribute to the rich peacebuilding field. 
The challenge for the Peacebuilding Architecture in this regard re-
mains to bring together this expertise to build a cohesive approach and 
put forward a coherent effort with all actors focused on agreed priori-
ties.  
 
 
 
Part Four: Immediate Challenges -- 
What Next? 
Peacebuilding through the new architecture has made a modest but 
encouraging start. In the first two or three years it has been possible to 
identify a number of challenges, some of them related to ensuring an 
effective process for the Commission itself, but others related to a 
broader strategic vision for Commission members and the UN more 
broadly.  
 
On the workings of the Commission:  
 
 It is important to keep the PBA focused, at least initially, on 
those crises that would otherwise be the forgotten countries. If 
the PBA is drawn into the major crises which are already the 
subject of massive international effort it will risk having little 
value added at this stage. It is in Haiti and Liberia, Burundi 
and Sierra Leone, that the PBA can make a difference, not in 
Afghanistan or Iraq which already have access to sustained at-
tention.  
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 In coordinating the efforts of all the players, the Commission 
must involve active and operational participation of the IFIs 
and the donors, not just UN actors. This can happen through a 
mechanism whereby the donors and IFIs as well as the UN 
participate with the Commission in designing strategic ap-
proaches and then commit to applying them to their own ope-
rations. If there are no operational implications for these major 
field players of the work of the PBA, the PBA efforts will have 
no meaning. Donors, in particular, must avoid “going it alone” 
and commit to a collective effort. 
 Countries under consideration must engage with the PBC to 
find ways to stay on track. Sovereignty and ownership does 
not preclude the fact that they have come to the Commission 
for help and advice.  
 The recommendations contained in the IPBS for each country 
must lead to practical programmes which are fully funded and 
implemented. This means that member states of the PBC must 
take seriously their mandate to mobilize real resources.  
 Each member of the PBC will need to determine what contri-
bution it can make individually to the PBC’s success on the 
ground. The PBC success will be the sum of its parts and 
members must avoid the tendency to hide behind the collective 
nature of an inter-governmental body. 
 The working methodology of the Commission must be re-
viewed. It is not feasible for 31 + member states to engage in 
detailed planning with more and more countries. This work 
must be delegated to technical teams who can report to the 
PBC, in the same way that DPKO submits mission plans and 
regular reports to the Security Council. 
 The PBSO must be funded and staffed at a level suitable to 
manage the peacebuilding agenda, interact with the PBC, man-
age the fund, mobilize peacebuilding funding, liaise with the 
field missions and work with all the operational actors. 
 Field missions must be mounted in PBC countries to engage 
with local actors, provide support to external actors and chan-
nel funding. This can be financed either through Security 
Council mandates or through the regular budget of the UN  
Secretariat. 
 
On the broader agenda: 
 
 The Commission will not be able to address all the world’s 
post conflict situations. The PBA must use the process to 
learn lessons which can be applied more broadly to ensure 
the widest possible multiplier effect. The Commission can 
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direct this effort without actually running a peacebuilding 
process in each affected country. 
 The PB Architecture will need to enhance the study of root 
causes to help assess how we can make a real difference in 
understanding why countries fall back into conflict as a basis 
for keeping them on track. How can we ensure that our  
actions and investments are as effective as possible and 
aimed at the right targets? This will require engaging the re-
search community at a more sophisticated level and develop-
ing the capability to take a stronger leadership role.  
 Research is also required to better understand the history of 
neglect. This should be coordinated with the OECD/DAC to 
devise means to ensure that donor decision-making on the al-
location of aid funds doesn’t leave some countries out in the 
cold and create more forgotten crises.  
 Can we use the PBC to overcome the ongoing tension in the 
UN on the North-South divide? Can success in peacebuild-
ing help to bring the Peace and Security agenda closer to the 
Development agenda and promote greater cooperation 
among member states in working together on these issues 
which we now realize are often two sides of the same coin? 
 
 
 
Part Five: The Longer Term Vision for 
the PBC -- from 2010 to 2020 
The 2010 review of the resolutions founding the Peacebuilding Archi-
tecture offer an opportunity to address the challenge for the Peace-
building Commission: which is whether it can become the place in the 
international structure where we can address state failure and the stra-
tegic, global security and human implications of neglect. Can decision 
makers be convinced that we cannot afford to see a large segment of 
the world’s population slip further and further back from the growth 
pattern which increasingly characterizes the rest of the world? 
  
The current age is characterized by a growing commitment to solve 
some of the world’s intractable problems along with a growing con-
sensus on the priorities, although we are far from consensus on the 
methodologies or on the need for appropriate resources. How do we 
bring certain countries, war torn and painfully poor, into the world 
community? If not for reasons of justice alone, then for reasons of 
global security, we must address that class of countries which are slid-
ing back. As noted above, Paul Collier, one of the main authors of the 
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World Bank’s report on Conflict and Development of 2004 (one of the 
documents behind the creation of the Peacebuilding Architecture) has 
addressed the question of what he calls “The Bottom Billion”13. Mr. 
Collier’s thesis is that, rather than continue to see the world in terms 
of the billion “haves” and the five billion “have-nots”, we need to re-
cognize that of the five billion in the developing world, about 80% 
now live in countries where there is discernible progress. It is the last 
20%, or one billion, who live in countries (many but not all in Africa) 
that are stagnant or sliding back, which represent the great challenge. 
Some of these countries are the ones where the international commu-
nity is now committed to making massive security investments, 
whether DRC, Haiti or Liberia, expenditures which could have been 
avoided if these countries had not been left alone to fail in the first 
place.  
 
The reasons for this phenomenon are complex, but part of the reason 
lies in the aid relationships which evolved in the 1990’s. After the ter-
rible effects of the third world debt crisis (caused as much by irre-
sponsible first world lending institutions as by third world borrowers) 
and the equally terrible excesses of structural adjustment, donors be-
gan a process of entering into more equal contractual relationships of 
providing assistance to countries which committed to certain perform-
ance standards and targets. Donors drew up their eligibility lists not 
only on the basis of historical and economic partnerships but on 
whether their aid money would bring returns in growth and progress. 
While this was an improvement over the aid relationships which char-
acterized either cold war politics or structural adjustment economics, 
it neglected to deal with the question of how to assist non-performing 
countries to reach a level of acceptable performance. A number of 
countries, for different reasons, whether local corruption, weak institu-
tions, civil conflict, for example, became understandably less attrac-
tive to bilateral donors.  
 
We are now paying the price for walking away from these countries. 
The countries themselves have paid an enormous price in death and 
disease, war and economic failure. The international community has 
paid the price in heightened international security risks, in humanitar-
ian assistance and in peacekeeping missions. Now we are recognizing 
that humanitarian and peacekeeping assistance can get people and 
their communities to a certain level, but that this is not enough. An-
other level of investment and involvement will be required.  
 
As improved research into the link between conflict and development 
recognized the risks of leaving such countries to descend into poverty 
and conflict, the emerging peacebuilding community gained accep-
                                                 
13  Collier, 2007 
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tance for an analysis which recognized the interrelatedness of political 
and security concerns with economic, social and human rights con-
cerns. Global interest in addressing the wide range of political crises 
has led to more consistent mediation approaches; humanitarian coor-
dination and response tools continue to improve; peacekeeping has 
gone from strength to strength and now includes a broad array of civil-
ian peacebuilding functions; and financial and development institu-
tions are developing new tools to respond to the needs of fragile 
states. In addition, strengthened human rights and international justice 
mechanisms are building a framework to put an end to impunity and 
flagrant abuses. But we are not “there” yet. We have not yet brought it 
all together.  
 
Kofi Annan’s report “In Larger Freedom”14 stated that “no part of the 
United Nations system effectively addresses the challenge of helping 
countries with the transition from war to lasting peace”. The Peace-
building Architecture was created to help achieve this end. Massive 
investments have been and are being made to deal with the conse-
quences of state failure. The concomitant investments in helping coun-
tries stay the course must be seen as an obligatory follow on. Similar 
investments in conflict countries which have not benefited from a 
peacekeeping mission are equally essential.  
Elements of a New 2020 Vision 
The Peacebuilding Commission, as it comes out of its first years of 
operation must decide whether it wants to become a leader on these 
issues. 2010 sees the mandated first five year review of the Peace-
building Architecture and offers an opportunity to outline a new long 
term vision. To move forward the PBA must develop a more aggres-
sive approach as follows:  
 
First, the PBC must build a more confident and mature relationship 
with other UN bodies, particularly the Security Council. This is par-
ticularly important in developing a greater understanding of the fun-
damental link between security and development (or rather the lack of 
development). Regular consultations should take place with the Coun-
cil on areas of interest, particularly on potential countries for the 
PBC’s agenda. Countries such as Liberia, Haiti and East Timor should 
move gradually onto the PBC agenda, and there could even be a tran-
sition period when both bodies follow events in the same countries. 
The PBC must give up the fiction that the General Assembly and 
ECOSOC have the same role in managing peacebuilding as does the 
                                                 
14  United Nations, In Larger Freedom: towards development, security and human rights for 
all. A/59/2005, 21 March 2005 
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Security Council, but regular briefings of these bodies, and full 
fledged discussions can take place regularly.  
 
Second, member states of the PBC, including interested potential new 
members should have a frank debate outside the UN walls on how to 
get over the sterile North South debates and reach a partnership of 
trust among member states based on an understanding of how the poli-
tical and economic agendas interact and must work together for the 
same end. This will require a discussion and agreement on what 
peacebuilding means for the PBA and how the Commission as a body 
(and member states individually) plan on implementing peacebuild-
ing. This discussion should include recognition of the costs of peace-
building, both in terms of the UN infrastructure required and in terms 
of the investment in post-conflict countries as well as awareness of the 
cost of not making such an investment. It should include an agreed 
definition of all aspects of peacebuilding, from prevention, through 
peace making, peacekeeping, post conflict support and long term de-
velopment and commercial investment for sustainable peace.  
 
Third, this should lead to a clearer claim for a PBA role in all aspects 
of UN peacebuilding including peacemaking and peace operations. 
This includes arguing for preventive development investment in neg-
lected and fragile countries which have not experienced conflict. It 
should include outlining criteria to ensure that peace negotiations in-
clude long term peacebuilding strategies and that such negotiations 
include all affected sectors of society, not just combatants and politi-
cal players. (The recent Secretary-General’s report to the Security 
Council on peacemaking was a serious lost opportunity, with no men-
tion of peacebuilding, and no reference to the Peacebuilding Commis-
sion. Once again the UN Secretariat continued to operate within its 
separate silos.) The PBC should be asked to advise the Security Coun-
cil on peacekeeping missions to ensure that peacekeeping operations 
continue to be designed with fully funded civilian peacebuilding ope-
rations.15 
 
Fourth, the PBC must seriously address its mandate of mobilizing 
resources for peacebuilding, either through the General Assembly 
adopting a process of assessed budgets for peacebuilding operations, 
or through a more predictable form of voluntary funding, based on 
negotiated estimates of requirements by country. If PBC member 
states cannot show a willingness to finance long term peacebuilding, it 
will become little more than a talk shop and will not develop the 
credibility to engage with the Security Council on taking on new 
countries as outlined above. While maintaining and expanding the 
                                                 
15  Report of the Secretary-General on enhancing mediation and its support activities, 
S/2009/189, 8 April 2009 
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Peacebuilding Fund can be one small element of such a strategy,  
financing for Peacebuilding must go well beyond the PBF. Investment 
in economic and social development on the ground, while helping 
countries to attract private investment is crucial in giving citizens an 
investment in peace. For conflicts which take place in resource poor 
environments, this is particularly important and requires the develop-
ment of new strategies.  
 
Fifth, the PBA should support the creation of UN mandated integrated 
peacebuilding missions on the ground, bringing together all UN enti-
ties, funded by the General Assembly. Such missions can bring in ex-
pertise and assist the local government to coordinate multilateral, bi-
lateral and civil society players around the Integrated Peacebuilding 
strategies including resource mobilization for programs arising out of 
the strategies.  
 
Sixth, the PBA must invest in partnerships with the research commu-
nity to develop methodologies for assessing why countries fall back 
into conflict and what are the key elements of keeping countries on 
course for peace. Much of the research is underway. What is needed is 
a process to finance the implementation of such research in post con-
flict situations and bring it together in a forum where ideas can be 
tested on the ground.  
 
Seventh, the PB Architecture must draw on the authority of the UN 
Secretary-General and insist that the UN Secretariat and related funds 
and programmes work together coherently to understand and address 
peacebuilding across the various UN sectors, political, security, de-
velopment, humanitarian and human rights. The UN secretariat should 
be provided with the resources via an expanded PBSO to support the 
PBC and the UNSG to bring the system together, to develop peace-
building strategies for all aspects of peace operations, to mobilize 
funding, commission research and to support field missions.  
 
Eighth, OECD/DAC members continue to examine their policies vis-
à-vis countries in conflict, or coming out of conflict. This can continue 
the work of developing policies and methodologies for working in 
post-conflict areas, but should also include a managed process of re-
viewing donor allocations of aid to recipient countries, to avoid the 
neglect of “aid orphans”. Within the context of the PBC, donor mem-
bers should review their relationships with countries on the PBC 
agenda, with a view to ensuring that no post-conflict country is with-
out a minimum number of donor partners. Other funding mechanisms, 
such as trust funds can be put in place to enable other donors to con-
tribute to countries where they do not have an official bilateral rela-
tionship.  
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Finally, the Peacebuilding Commission must seek to become the cen-
tral point in the global system which can bring together all the actors 
in every sense, whether around peacebuilding experiences, the imple-
mentation of a particular country strategy, or around issues, research 
and global solutions. 
 
 
 
Conclusion 
The PBA is at a critical moment. It has had some small success but 
has not yet moved on to develop as an essential player. It risks being 
overshadowed by events on the ground, either in cases where external 
actors are already engaged and are moving faster than the PBC, or in 
its own agenda countries where it is not bringing the resources to bear 
to have the desired impact. It is time for the PBC to develop a persona 
of its own; to develop cooperative strategies which avoid old 
north/south jargon; to insist on a more mature relationship with the 
Security Council; to address each country situation seriously with suf-
ficient resources, appropriate interventions and political support based 
on a true understanding of the local dynamic. 
 
The PBA must also engage the Secretary-General, who should be con-
vinced of the need for this instrument, both inter-governmental and 
inter-departmental. Senior officials in the UN need to engage in a 
peacebuilding dynamic, based on the recognition that political solu-
tions cannot be divorced from economic solutions, and vice-versa, that 
economic activity cannot take place unless the political framework is 
conducive to its success. The PBSO’s ability to drive a cooperative 
approach within the UN depends not only on its own leadership, but 
on the cooperation of the leadership of UN political, peacekeeping, 
development, humanitarian and human rights entities.  
 
These are modest proposals, and most are within the framework of 
existing structures, but may well be beyond the ability of member 
states to agree on in the forthcoming debate on the review of the PBA. 
However, the growing awareness of peacebuilding in general and the 
peacebuilding architecture in particular already represent concrete 
steps forward. The question will be whether member states will see in 
the PBA a symbol of both hope and perseverance: hope for the many 
millions of people throughout the world who are striving to keep their 
societies on the fragile road to peace; and perseverance, for Member 
States and the United Nations System, to find creative means to over-
come the obstacles that impede sustained support to end suffering and 
ensure sustainable peace and development in a more secure world. 
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